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Abstract  It has been shown recently that the use of two pairs of resistors with
enhanced Johnson-noise and a Kirchhoff-loop—i.e., a Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-
Noise (KLJN) protocol—for secure key distribution leads to information theoretic
security levels superior to those of a quantum key distribution, including a natural
immunity against a man-in-the-middle attack. This issue is becoming particularly
timely because of the recent full cracks of practical quantum communicators, as
shown in numerous peer-reviewed publications. This presentation first briefly
surveys the KLJN system and then discusses related, essential questions such as:
what are perfect and imperfect security characteristics of key distribution, and how
can these two types of securities be unconditional (or information theoretical)?
Finally the presentation contains a live demonstration.
1. Introduction: quantum security hacked
Practical quantum communicators—including several commercial ones—have
been fully cracked, as shown in numerous recent papers [1-15], and Vadim
Makarov, who is one of the leading quantum crypto crackers, says in Nature News
2that “Our hack gave 100% knowledge of the key, with zero disturbance to the
system” [1]. This claim hits at the foundations of quantum encryption schemes
because the basis of the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols is
the assumption that any eavesdropper (Eve) will disturb the system enough to be
detected by the communicator parties (Alice and Bob). Furthermore this proves
that we were right in 2007 when claiming in our SPIE Newsroom article [16] that
quantum security is mainly theoretical because, at that time, no effort had been
made to experimentally crack the communicators; instead research grants
supported the development of new QKD schemes but not the “politically
incorrect” challenge to crack them.
However, the last few years have seen a radical changed the picture [1-15] on
the security of practical quantum communicators, and even a full-field
implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system has
been carried out [2], which is a most difficult task and is an attack on an already
established “secure” QKD connection. These cracking schemes are referred to as
“hacking” because they utilize physical non-idealities in the building elements of
QKD devices. The number of these non-idealities is large, and so is the number of
hacking types. The key lessons that has been learned here are that
(i) Quantum security at the moment is theoretical, and the applied theory is
incorrect for practical devices; a new defense mechanism must be developed for
each type of hacking attack, and the potential for yet unexplored non-idealities/
attacks is huge, and
(ii) Security analysis, taking into the account of the real physics of the devices,
is essential when security matters.
An important aspects all these quantum attacks is the extraordinary (100%)
success ratio (i.e., information leak) of extracting the “secure” key bits by Eve,
while Alice and Bob do not have a clue that efficient eavesdropping is going on.
At this point we note that this information leak was only 0.19% for the classical
secure communication scheme we are discussing in this paper in the case of a
similar situation wherein the strongest vulnerability based on physical non-
idealities was used; this is discussed further below.
Inspired by these interesting developments we discuss related issues in the key
exchange system of the classical physical Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN)
protocol [16]. It should be noted here that there is a general misunderstanding of
the KLJN scheme among people lacking the relevant expertise in statistical
physics and noise-in-circuitry, as evidenced for example in the Wikipedia entry
“Kish cypher” and its “talk page” where, most of the time, both the supporters and
the opponents are wrong and the debate falls very short of an objective scientific
discussion (amusingly, even the name “cypher” is incorrect). Therefore, after
briefly surveying the KLJN system and its properties, we clarify the meaning of
perfect security and imperfect security levels and also define the conditions of
these measures: information theoretic security (or unconditional security) and its
limited version computationally unconditional security. Furthermore we mention
3existing integer-number-based key exchange protocols that have
(computationally) conditional security. It will be seen that theoretical/ideal QKD
and KLJN protocols have perfect information theoretic (unconditional) security.
However these schemes, when realized with practical/realistic (physical/non-ideal)
building elements have imperfect security that is still information theoretic
(unconditional), even though current QKD cracks [1-15] indicate that KLJN
performs better.
2. The KLJN secure key exchange protocol
It is often believed that quantum physics represents modern science and that
classical physics is old and outdated. Of course this is not true because the two
fields rather pertain to different physical size regimes—the “small” versus the
“large” where the appropriate rules of physics are different—not different periods
of science history. The above claim regarding “modern” and “old” cannot be
maintained even for the history of physics, though, when the point at issue
concerns spontaneous random fluctuation phenomena, that are simply referred to
as “noise”, and it is true for even the most general and omnipresent type of
classical physical noise, viz., thermal noise (voltage or current fluctuations in
thermal equilibrium) which is a younger field of physics than quantum mechanics.
Indeed two Swedish scientists, John Johnson and Harry Nyquist both working at
Bell Labs, discovered/explained the thermal noise voltage of resistors [17,18]
several years after the completion of the foundations of quantum physics [19].
Similarly, quantum heat engines [20] with optional internal coherence effects
[21] were proposed several years earlier than the application [22] of the thermal
noise of resistors for a heat engine scheme with similar coherence effects.
Finally, the application of thermal noise for unconventional informatics,
namely for noise-based logic and computing [23-30] and the KJLN secure key
exchange [31-46], emerged decades later than the corresponding quantum
informatics schemes such as quantum computing [47] and quantum encryption
[48-50].
It is interesting to not that some "exotic" phenomena previously thought to
belong to the class of "quantum-weirdness" occur and can be utilized also in the
noise schemes, for example: teleportation/telecloning in KLJN networks [45] and
entanglement in noise-based logic [23-30].
2.1 The Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise key distribution 1
                                                           
1 This section is a modified version of related expositions elsewhere [36,46].
4The KLJN secure key exchange scheme was introduced in 2005 [31-33] and
was built and demonstrated in 2007 [34]; it is founded on the robustness of
classical information as well as stochasticity and the laws of classical physics. It
was named by its creators the “Kirchhoff-loop-Johnson(-like)-Noise” scheme,
while on the internet—in blogs and similar sites, including Wikipedia—it has
widely been nicknamed “Kish cypher” or “Kish cipher” (where both designations
are wrong). The concept has often been misinterpreted and misjudged.
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Figure 1. Core of the KJLN secure key exchange system [31]. In the text below, the
mathematical treatment is based on the power density spectra of the voltages and currents shown
in the figure.
The KLJN scheme is a statistical-physical competitor to quantum
communicators whose security is based on Kirchhoff's Loop Law and the
Fluctuation-Dissipation Theorem. More generally, it is founded on the Second
Law of Thermodynamics, which indicates that the security of the ideal scheme is
as strong as the impossibility to build a perpetual motion machine of the second
kind.
We first briefly survey the foundations of the KLJN system [31,33,36].
Figure 1 shows a model of the idealized KLJN scheme designed for secure key
exchange [31]. The resistors RL and RH represent the low, L (0), and high, H (1),
bits, respectively. At each clock period, Alice and Bob randomly choose one of
the resistors and connect it to the wire line. The situation LH or HL represents
secure bit exchange [31], because Eve cannot distinguish between them through
measurements, while LL and HH  are insecure. The Gaussian voltage noise
generators (white noise with publicly agreed bandwidth) represent a
corresponding thermal noise at a publicly agreed effective temperature   
€ 
Teff
(typically   
€ 
Teff > 109 K [34]). According to the Fluctuation-Dissipation Theorem,
the power density spectra   
€ 
Su,L( f )  and   
€ 
Su,H ( f )  of the voltages   
€ 
U L,A(t)  and
  
€ 
U L,B(t)  supplied by the voltage generators in   
€ 
RL  and   
€ 
RH  are given by
  
€ 
Su,L( f ) = 4kTeff RL   and    Su,H ( f ) = 4kTeff RH     , (1)
respectively.
5In the case of secure bit exchange (i.e., the LH or HL situation), the power
density spectrum of channel voltage   
€ 
U ch(t)  and channel current   
€ 
I ch(t)  are given
as
  
€ 
Su,ch( f ) = 4kTeff
RLRH
RL + RH
 ,               (2)
and
  
€ 
Si,ch(t) =
4kTeff
RL + RH
; (3)
further details are given elsewhere [31,36]. It should be observed that during the
LH or HL case, linear superposition turns Equation (2) into the sum of the spectra
of two situations, i.e., when only the generator in   
€ 
RL  is running one gets
  
€ 
SL,u,ch( f ) = 4kTeff RL
RH
RL + RH
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2
        , (4)
and when the generator in   
€ 
RH  is running one has
  
€ 
SH,u,ch( f ) = 4kTeff RH
RL
RL + RH
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2
. (5)
The ultimate security of the system against passive attacks is provided by the
fact that the power   
€ 
PH→L , by which the Johnson noise generator of resistor   
€ 
RH  is
heating resistor   
€ 
RL , is equal to the power   
€ 
PL→H  by which the Johnson noise
generator of resistor   
€ 
RL  is heating resistor  
€ 
RH  [31,36]. A proof of this can also be
derived from Equation (3) for a frequency bandwidth of   
€ 
Δf by
  
€ 
PL→H =
SL,u,ch( f )Δf
RH
= 4kTeff
RLRH
(RL + RH )
2 ,             (6a)
and
  
€ 
PH→L =
SH,u,ch( f )Δf
RL
= 4kTeff
RLRH
(RL + RH )
2 .             (6b)
The equality   
€ 
PH→L =  
€ 
PL→H  (cf. Equations 6) is in accordance with the Second
Law of Thermodynamics; violating this equality would mean not only going
against basic laws of physics and the inability to build a perpetual motion machine
(of the second kind) but also allow Eve to use the voltage-current cross-correlation
  
€ 
U ch(t)I ch(t)  to extract the bit [31]. However   
€ 
U ch(t)I ch(t)  = 0, and hence
Eve has an insufficient number of independent equations to determine the bit
location during the LH or HL situation. The above security proof against passive
(listening) attacks holds only for Gaussian noise, which has the well-known
6property that its power density spectrum or autocorrelation function provides the
maximum information about the noise and no higher order distribution functions
or other tools are able to contribute additional information.
It should be observed [31,33,34,36] that deviations from the shown
circuitry—including parasitic elements, inaccuracies, non-Gaussianity of the
noise, etc.—will cause a potential information leak toward Eve. One should note
that the circuit symbol “line” in the circuitry represents an ideal wire with uniform
instantaneous voltage and current along it. Thus if the wire is so long and the
frequencies are so high that waves appear in it, this situation naturally means that
the actual circuitry deviates from the ideal one because neither the voltage nor the
current is uniform along the line [31].
To provide unconditional security against invasive attacks, including the man-
in-the-middle attack, the fully armed KLJN system shown in Figure 2 monitors
the instantaneous current and voltage values at both ends (i.e., for Alice as well as
Bob) [33,34,36], and these values are compared either via broadcasting them or
via an authenticated public channel. An alarm goes off whenever the circuitry is
changed or tampered with or energy is injected into the channel. It is important to
note that these current and voltage data contain all of the information Eve can
possess. This implies that Alice and Bob have full knowledge about the
information Eve may have; this is a particularly important property of the KLJN
system, which can be utilized in secure key exchange.
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Figure 2. Sketch of the KLJN wire communication arrangement [33,36]. To detect the invasive
eavesdropper (represented, for example, by the current generator at the middle), the
instantaneous current and voltage data measured at the two ends are broadcasted and compared.
The eavesdropping is detected immediately, within a small fraction of the time needed to transfer
a single bit. Thus statistics of bit errors is not needed, so the exchange of even a single key bit is
secure.
The situation discussed above implies the following important features of the
KLJN system [31,33,34,36]:
(1) In a practical (non-idealized) KLJN system, Eve can utilize device non-
idealities to extract some of the information by proper measurements. This is
7measurement information and does not depend on Eve’s computational and
algorithmic ability, i.e., the level of security is computationally unconditional. The
maximum leak toward Eve can be designed by Alice and Bob by supposing the
physically allowed best/ultimate measurement system for Eve. This designed level
of security is unconditional in every sense.
(2) Even when the communication is disturbed by invasive attacks or inherent
non-idealities in the KLJN arrangement, the system remains secure because no
information can be eavesdropped by Eve without the full knowledge of Alice and
Bob about this potential incidence, and without the knowledge of the full
information that Eve might have extracted (a full analysis of this aspect is
provided elsewhere [36]).
(3) In other words, the KLJN system is always secure, even when it is built
with non-ideal elements or designed for a non-zero information leak, in the
following sense: The current and voltage data inform Alice and Bob about the
exact information leak and hence, for each compromised key bit, they can decide
to discard it or even to use it to mislead/manipulate Eve [36].
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Figure 3. A practical KLJN device set-up [34]. Double-ended arrows symbolize computer
control.      
(4) The KLJN arrangement is naturally and fully protected against the man-in-
the-middle attack [33] even during the very first run of the operation when no
hidden signatures can be applied. This feature is provided by the unique property
of the KLJN system that zero bit information can only be extracted during a man-
in-the-middle attack because the alarm goes off before the exchange of a single
key bit has taken place [33].
(5) The security of the KLJN system is not based on the error statistics of key
bits, and even the exchange of single key bits is secure.
8Figure 3 outlines a prototype of the KLJN device [34]. The various non-
idealities have been addressed by different tools with the aim that the information
leak toward Eve due to non-idealities should stay below 1% of the exchanged raw
key bits. For the KLJN device it was 0.19% for the most efficient attack [18]. Here
we briefly address two aspects of non-idealities:
(i) The role of the line filter (and of the band limitation of the noise generator)
is to provide the no-wave limit in the cable, i.e., to preserve the core circuitry (cf.
Figure 1) in the whole frequency band. This implies that the shortest wavelength
component in the driving noise should be much longer than twice the cable length
in order to guarantee that no active wave modes and related effects (e.g. ,
reflection, invasive attacks at high frequencies, etc.) take place in the cable.
(ii) Another tool to fight non-idealities is the cable capacitance compensation
(“capacitor killer”) arrangement (cf. Figure 3). With practical cable parameters
and their limits, there is a more serious threat of the security: the cable capacitance
shortcuts part of the noise current which results in a greater current at the side of
the lower resistance end thus yields an information leak. This effect can be
avoided by a cable-capacitor-killer [34] using the inner wire of a coax cable as
KLJN line while the outer shield of the cable is driven by the same voltage as the
inner wire. However, this is done via a follower voltage amplifier with zero output
impedance. The outer shield will then provide all the capacitive currents toward
the ground, and the inner wire will experience zero parasitic capacitance. Without
“capacitor killer” arrangement and practical bare-wire line parameters, the
recommended upper limit of cable length is much shorter and depends on the
driving resistor values RL and RH .
2.2. Security proofs and attacks
      The ideal system is absolutely secure, but real systems are rarely ideal and thus
hacking attacks are possible by using non-idealities. Fortunately the KLJN system
is very simple, implying that the number of such attacks is limited. Several
hacking attack types based on the non-ideality of circuit elements causing
deviations from the ideal circuitry have been published [36-42]. Each of these
attacks triggered a relevant security proof that showed the efficiency of the
defense mechanism (cf. Figure 2). Furthermore, all known attack types were
experimentally tested [34], and the theoretical security proofs were experimentally
confirmed.
      For practical conditions, the most effective attack employed voltage-drop-
related effects on non-zero wire resistance [32,37,38]. It should be noted that
serious calculation errors were made by Scheuer and Yariv [37] resulting in a
thousand times stronger predicted value of the effect than its real magnitude. The
errors were pointed out and the calculations were corrected by Kish and Scheuer
[38]. In an experimental demonstration [34], the strongest leak was indeed due to
9wire resistance, and 0.19% of the bits leaked out (  
€ 
1.9*10−3 relative information
leak) to Eve, while the fidelity of the key exchange was 99.98% (which means
0.02% bit error rate). This is a very good raw bit leak, and it can easily be made
infinitesimally small by simple two-step privacy amplification, as further
discussed in Section 2.3.
A general response to the mentioned and other types of small-non-ideality
attacks was also presented [39], and the related information leak was shown to be
miniscule due to the very poor statistics that Eve could obtain.
Other attack types of less practical significance were based on differences in
noise temperatures by Hao [40], which were proven theoretically [41] and
experimentally [34] insignificant. The very high accuracy of digital simulations
and digital-analog converters (at least 12-bit resolution) allows setting the
effective temperature so accurately (0.01% or less error) that this type of
inaccuracy-based information leak is not observable. In the case of 12-bit
resolution, the theoretical value of the relative information leak is   
€ 
6*10−11, i.e., to
leak out one effective bit would require a 600 Megabit long key. Therefore this
effect was not visible in the experiments even though extraordinarily long (74497)
key bits were generated/exchanged in each run [34].
The practical inaccuracy of commercial low-cost resistors (1%) at the two ends
[34,41] is a much more serious issue; the theoretical value is <10-4 relative
information leak (about 7 bits leak from the 74497 bit long key) for a resistance
inaccuracy of 1% [34]. However, its impact was still not measurable because of
the statistical inaccuracies, 
€ 
74497 ≈ 270  bits, at this key length. These
inaccuracies were about forty times greater than the theoretical information leak of
7 [34].
Wire capacitance would be the most serious source of information leak without
the cable-capacitance-killer arrangement, but cable inductance effects are
negligible [36].
Another attack [42] focusing on delay effects obtained 70% information leak
with a wire simulation software by using physically invalid parameters, such as
cable diameters being 28,000 greater than the diameter of the known universe at
two km cable length (the error in this attack [42] was pointed out in a subsequent
paper [36]). Although this attack was flawed, it is remarkable that even this non-
existent, high information leak can be removed by a three-step privacy
amplification as discussed in Section 2.3.
It is important to note that the level of allowed information leak is the choice of
Alice and Bob, and its actual value is determined only by the invested resources
and also typically depends on how much speed is given up. For example, the
information leak due to the wire resistance scales inversely with the 6th power of
wire diameter, which means that employing a ten times thicker cable would
reduce the relative information leak of 0.19% to   
€ 
1.9*10−9 .
     For Eve the best attack strategy is to observe the public data exchange about
the instantaneous current and voltage amplitudes between Alice and Bob. Those
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data contain the highest amount of eavesdropping information because they are
measured in the most ideal way, and Alice and Bob also base their decision about
the bit values on those. Enhancing Eve’s infrastructure beyond that ability does
not improve her situation, and thus the security is information theoretic/
unconditional.
2.3. Privacy amplification in non-ideal systems
Privacy amplification is a classical software-based technique, which was
originally developed for QKD to ensure the security of an encryption scheme with
partially exposed key bits. Horvath et al. [43] realized simple privacy
amplification by executing XOR logic operation on the subsequent pairs of the
key bits, thereby halving the key length while progressively reducing the
information leak. If the reduction of the information leak is not enough, the same
procedure can be repeated on the new key. The resulting key length scales with
0.5N, where N is the number of these privacy amplification steps. It was found
that, in contrast to quantum key distribution schemes, the high fidelity of the raw
key generated in the KLJN system allows the users to always extract a secure
shorter key. The necessary conditions are sufficiently high fidelity (small bit error
rate), which the KLJN provides, and an upper limit less than one on the
eavesdropper probability to correctly guess the exchanged key bits, which means
the key exchange is not fully cracked (less than 100% relative information leak is
present). The number of privacy amplification steps needed to achieve an
information leak of less than 10-8 in the case of the 0.19% raw bit information leak
is two, thus resulting in a corresponding slowdown by a factor of four [43]. In the
case of the 70% information leak obtained by the flawed simulations in earlier
work [42], the necessary number of privacy amplification steps is three thus
resulting in a slowdown of a factor of eight [43].
3. Security measures and their conditions
In this section we discuss security measures [52,53] and apply them to compare
QKD, KLJN and software security schemes.
A perfect security level means that the information channel capacity of the
eavesdropping-channel from Alice/Bob toward Eve is zero. Imperfect security
level means that the information channel capacity of the eavesdropping-channel
from Alice/Bob toward Eve is non-zero. We call the encryption “cracked” if Eve
can extract all of the information communicated between Alice and Bob. Thus an
imperfect security level does not necessarily mean that the encryption is cracked.
If the bit-error-rate (BER) is negligible then, by using privacy amplification, the
effective level of imperfect security can be enhanced so that it can arbitrarily
approach the perfect security level.
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To characterize the situations of perfect and imperfect security levels, we must
address the conditions where these levels hold. Conditions that both QKD and the
KLJN protocols represent are called information theoretic security, or
unconditional security. We note, in passing, that these terms are often completely
misunderstood by people who write into Wikipedia and to blog sites about the
KLJN system, and these mistakes lead to incorrect conclusions and self-
contradicting arguments.
The most rigorous security condition is information theoretic security, which
means that the information content of the data Eve can extract is limited by
information theory even if Eve is using the hypothetical most powerful processing
of the extracted data. Unconditional security is a similar term indicating security
when Eve has unlimited resources. It often means a computationally unconditional
security measure, which limits the infrastructure to computers and algorithms, so
it has limited validity compared to information theoretic security. Computationally
unconditional security simply means that the information content of the data that
Eve is able to extract is limited even if she has infinite computing power.
For example, today’s generally used software algorithms utilizing prime
numbers for key generation and distribution have neither information-theoretic nor
computationally unconditional security. All of the information about the key exists
in the data observed in the line by Eve, in a decodable form, thus it cannot be
information theoretically secure. This information can be fully decoded with a
sufficiently fast computer or integer-factoring algorithm, or with a normal
computer running for long-enough but finite time. The security is
(computationally) conditional: it is based on the assumption that Eve does not
have an efficient algorithm or a fast-enough computer to decode the key within the
practically relevant time frame.
It is important to note that even imperfect security can be information
theoretical or (computationally) unconditional [53]. Such a situation occurs with a
physically secure key distribution only, such as QKD or KLJN, because the
information leak will be determined by measurement information and not by
computation or algorithmic decoding.
The way in which ideal/theoretical QKD makes the key exchange secure is
based on the no-cloning theorem of quantum physics: photon states cannot be
cloned without introducing errors. Because information bits are carried by
(theoretically) single photons, Eve must clone the photon if she wants to measure
one; otherwise the information is destroyed before reaching the receiving party.
Thus Eve must clone the photon, which introduces extra errors into the line. When
Alice and Bob recognize the increased bit-error-rate, they conclude that
eavesdropping has happened and they discard the bit-package exhibiting the
increased error rate.
The ideal QKD protects the system against eavesdropping, but this is strictly
true only for an infinitely long key because Alice and Bob must prepare error
statistics, and exact statistics requires infinite time. Otherwise, due to statistical
12
fluctuations in the BER, Alice and Bob can never be absolutely sure that the key
was not eavesdropped. To illustrate this problem, we can go to the simplest type of
attacks: the intercept-resend attack for the BB84 QKD protocol (see, for example,
[51]). The probability   
€ 
P(N )  that the eavesdropping will be discovered while Eve
extracts  
€ 
N  key bits is not 1 but
  
€ 
Ph = 1−
3
4
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
N
. (7)
Table 1. Comparison of relevant security levels for existing key exchange systems. Practical
physically secure key distributions can never have perfect security, they can only approach it.
Perfect Imperfect
Information
theoretic or
unconditional
Conditional
QKD
theoretical
Y e s  for the
whole key
No  for a single
bit
N o  for the
whole key
Yes for a single
bit
Yes No
KLJN
theoretical
Yes for both the
whole key and a
single bit
No Yes No
QKD
practical
No Yes Yes No
KLJN practical No Yes Yes No
Software and
prime number
based
Yes No No Yes
Equation (7) shows that, even though a reasonably long key will be very secure
and that security can further be enhanced by privacy amplification (see above), the
security is not perfect although it can arbitrarily approach the perfect security
level. However, if we want to extract only a single key bit, the security is
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extremely poor because Eve has 25% chance to succeed.
      The way by which the ideal/theoretical KLJN scheme makes the key exchange
secure depends on the type of the attack: whether it is passive (listening) or
invasive (introducing energy in the channel and/or modifying the channel
circuitry). In the case of passive listening, information theoretic security due to
zero information in the extracted data is guaranteed by the Second Law of
Thermodynamics, and this is true even for single-bit attacks where QKD fails. In
the case of invasive attacks, the defense mechanics is similar to that of QKD;
Alice and Bob will observe deviations between instantaneous signals and they
detect the presence of eavesdropping virtually immediately so that, again, even a
single bit attack has no chance. Table 1 shows the summary/conclusion about the
security level of various key exchange protocols.
In conclusion, the ideal KLJN protocol protects a system against invasive
eavesdropping and provides zero information to passive eavesdroppers.
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